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Commercial Law-Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System v. Investment Company Institute: The Continuing
Conflict Between Commercial and Investment Banking
In 1972 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB)
amended Regulation Y,I thereby allowing bank holding companies to serve as
investment advisors to closed-end 2 investment companies. 3 Although this ac-
tion granted bank holding companies access to only a very narrow range of
investment banking functions,4 it nevertheless caused investment bankers to
"circle up the wagons" and fight for their territory.5 The reaction illustrated
1. Regulation Y is codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.1-225.142 (1982). The Federal Reserve
Board promulgated Regulation Y to facilitate performance of the duties assigned to it in the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Regulation Y is
authorized at 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1976): "The Board is authorized to issue such regulations and
orders as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this chapter
and prevent evasions thereof."
2. The primary difference between a closed-end investment company and an open-end in-
vestment company (i.e., mutual funds) is the degree of involvement in the issuance and redemp-
tion of fund shares. Typically, an open-end investment company continually issues new shares
and stands ready to redeem outstanding shares on request. After its initial organization, a closed-
end investment company issues shares at infrequent intervals, if at all, and does not stand ready to
redeem these shares on request. Due to these limitations, shares of many closed-end investment
companies are traded on the stock market. R. POZEN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CASES, MATERI-
ALS AND PROBLEMS ON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 187-88 (1978).
3. Effective February 1, 1972, the Board of Governors amended § 225.4(a) of Regula-
tion Y to add "serving as an investment advisor, as defined in section 2(a)(20) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, to an investment company registered under that Act"
to the list of activities it has determined to be so closely related to banking or managing
or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.
12 C.F.R. § 225.125(a) (1982).
Proceedings held during the FRB's consideration of the amendment raised several questions
about the broad scope of the investment advisory function in light of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-378 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and the Supreme Court decision in Investment
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). Subsequently, the FRB released an interpretive ruling, 12
C.F.R. § 225.125 (1982), that narrowed the scope of permissible activities. The interpretive ruling
forbids bank holding companies from: (1) sponsoring, organizing, or controlling an open-end
investment company, (2) acting as an investment advisor to an investment company that can be
identified with the bank holding company or its bank subsidiaries by its name or location; (3)
purchasing securities of the investment company being advised for the holding company's own
account, or, under the bank holding company's sole discretion, for the accounts for which the
bank acts as fiduciary or managing agent; (4) extending credit to the investment company being
advised, or accepting the investment company's securities as collateral for a loan that is being used
for the purpose of purchasing the investment company's securities; (5) engaging directly or indi-
rectly in the sale or distribution of the investment company's securities; and (6) investing the cash
funds of the investment company in time deposit or certificate of deposit accounts of any bank
affiliate. Id
4. Investment funds are just one aspect of the securities underwriting and trading activities
in which investment banking companies engage. In its interpretive ruling, the FRB further lim-
ited the scope of bank holding company involvement in such activities to the organization, opera-
tion, and control of closed-end investment companies. See supra note 1. A closed-end investment
company does not generally trade its securities after the initial organization and issuance of
shares. See supra note 2.
5. The investment banking industry has shown a willingness to challenge commercial bank
intrusion into what have traditionally been investment banking activities. During the last two
decades the industry has initiated litigation no fewer than four times, with varying degrees of
success. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46
(1981) (1972 amendment to Regulation Y, defining "investment advising" as an activity "closely
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once again that a major concern of the investment banking community is the
erosion of the protective barrier provided by the Glass-Steagall Act and the
subsequent influx of commercial banks into the investment banking industry.6
The Supreme Court's decision to uphold the FRB's amendment in Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute (FRB
v. IC) 7 further erodes the protection provided to investment bankers. The
decision, however, may have a much broader scope. In upholding the amend-
ment, the Court determined that the Glass-Steagall Act did not require separa-
tion between commercial and investment banking and indicated that absent
clear violation of congressional objectives, it would defer to the considered
judgment of the FRB in matters affecting the banking industry. Decisions of
this nature affect the structure and operation of the nation's financial markets
by providing greater flexibility for and competition between the entities that
compose the financial markets. This, in turn, affects the national economy,
which relies heavily on an effective capital market structure to enhance the
currently anemic rate of capital formation.8 With the Glass-Steagall Act re-
ceiving severe criticism for its inability to adapt to the changing financial com-
munity,9 the Supreme Court's decision provides additional support for those
who call for a complete revamping of the current regulatory structure.
To better understand the decision and its impact on the regulation of
financial markets, it is necessary to analyze the legislative history of the Glass-
Steagall Act and subsequent efforts by Congress and the courts to enforce it.
The enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 was one of the prophylactic
measures taken in reaction to the banking system's breakdown during the
Great Depression. While the liquidity crisis that induced the depression was
brought about by the culmination of several reinforcing influences within the
related to banking," did not exceed Board's statutory authority); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617 (1971) (Comptroller of the Currency's amendment to Regulation 9, allowing com-
mercial banks to operate what were the equivalent of mutual funds, was a violation of the Glass-
Steagall Act); New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 942 (1978) (whether automatic stock purchasing services offered by a national bank violated
the Glass-Steagall Act was a question that was not ripe for judicial scrutiny); Baker, Watts & Co.
v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp 247 (D.D.C. 1966), afdsub nom Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co.,
392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (commercial banks not permitted to underwrite state or municipal
revenue bonds).
6. Clark & Saunders, Judicial Interpretation of Glass-Steagall- The NeedJr Legislative Ac-
tion, 97 BANKINo LJ. 721, 723-24 (1980). The Glass-Steaall Act separates the activities of com-
mercial and investment banks. For a discussion of the basic provisions of the Act, see infra notes
19-25 and accompanying text.
7. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
8. Over the past decade the United States ranked last among major industrial nations in
productivity and in share of gross national product invested in expanding and upgrading the stock
of productive capital. See Bowen, How to Regain Our Competitive Edge, 103 FORTUNE, Mar. 9,
1981, at 74, 82; see also The Reindustrialization of America, Bus. WK., June 30, 1980, at 55.
9. The Senate Banking Securities Subcommittee and the SEC have expressed the need for a
comprehensive review of the Glass-Steagall Act. Clark & Saunders, Glass-SteagallRevised: The
Impact on Banks, Capital Markets, and the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J. 811, 811-13 (1980).
Critics have questioned the Act's ability to protect the investing public in light of changes in the
composition of the financial markets and the introduction of new securities products since the
Act's inception. The crucial questions are whether protection is necessary and, ifso, what form of
protection best meets the needs of the public. See Karmel, Glass-Steagal" Some CriticalAR~lec-
tions, 97 BANKINo L. . 631 (1980).
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United States and international economies, 10 the lack of control over practices
in the banking and securities industries was a major factor in bringing about
the stock market crash of 1929. These imprudent banking practices further
deflated what was already a decelerating economy.1
After the stock market crash, public attention focused on the security affil-
iates of banks. A Senate committee concluded that stock market loans made
by banks played a major role in fueling the speculative excesses that contrib-
uted to the market's collapse. 12 At the heart of the problem was what one
investigator called "a shocking corruption in our banking system, a wide-
spread repudiation of old-fashioned standards of honesty and fair dealing in
the creation and sale of securities, and a merciless exploitation of the vicious
possibilities of intricate corporate chicanery." 13
Congressional investigators identified two serious problems that were
caused by the affiliation between the banking and securities industries: concen-
tration of economic power and conflicts of interest.' 4 The danger inherent in
the concentration of economic power was realized during the Great Depres-
sion. Banks and security companies had become so interrelated that the stock
market collapse exerted great pressure on commercial banks, contributing to
an unprecedented number of bank failures. 15 The conflicts of interest problem
was twofold. First, public confidence in national banks was threatened by per-
mitting banks to have security affiliates. The close identification between the
bank and its security affiliate had the potential either to lower confidence in
the bank or to decrease the speculative nature of the securities market in the
eyes of the public. 6 Second, self-interest pressured the banks to support the
market price of stocks in companies in which they had a financial stake. 17
Both of these problems were exacerbated and finally uncovered by the col-
lapse of the stock market. Each fed off the other and the combination resulted
in the exploitation of "trusting" investors. 18
10. Problems in the international economic system, the structure of internal debts within the
United States, and overextension of credit in the real estate industry all contributed to the eco-
nomic decline in the early 1930s. M. LEE, MACROECONOMICS: FLUCTUATIONS, GROWTH, AND
STABILITY 175-88 (5th ed. 1971).
11. Id at 172-73. For a general review of the events surrounding the stock market's collapse
in 1929, see J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (1954).
12. See M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 7
(1977).
13. F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 283 (1939). The author, Ferdinand Pecora, was
counsel to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency from 1933 to 1934. In this capacity he
conducted the Senate investigation into banking and stock market practices.
14. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630-34.
15. M. LEE, supra note 10, at 180-81.
16. SeeA ,Resolution to Make a Complete Survey of the National andFederalReserve Banking
Systems: Hearings on S. Res. 71 Before the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency. 71st Cong.,
3d Sess. 999, 1063 (1931).
17. Id To protect securities issued by their securities affiliates, banks might be used as recep-
tacles for unsuccessful securities issuances or be compelled to make undesirable loans to either the
security affiliate or the issuing company. Peach, The Security 4ffiliates of National Banks, in 58
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE No. 3, at 113-14
(1941).
18. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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The Glass-SteagaU Act of 193319 was designed to help cure these deficien-
cies in the financial markets by divorcing commercial banks from their secur-
ity affiliates. The three primary objectives of the Glass-Steagal Act were: "(1)
to restore public confidence in banking following the 1929 stock market crash
and the accompanying widespread bank failures; (2) to ensure and maintain
general economic stability by prohibiting unsound and imprudent bank in-
vestments; and (3) to forestall potential conflicts of interest between commer-
cial and investment banking operations." 20 To these ends, the four sections of
the Act limit commercial bank involvement in securities underwriting. Sec-
tion 21 contains the basic restriction that prohibits any entity engaged in the
business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities from simul-
taneously engaging in commercial banking.21 Sections 20 and 32 prevent a
company from circumventing the basic prohibition by means of an affiliate or
an interlocking directorate.22 Section 16 defines the types of securities-related
services that commercial banks are authorized to perform.23 These include an
agency function through which banks may buy and seU securities as an agent
for the account of a customer (but not for its own account), an investment
portfolio function that permits the bank to purchase selected investment secur-
ities for its own account, and the unrestricted ability to deal in federal, state,
and municipal obligations for their accounts.24
Despite the attempt by Congress to partition the financial community
through the Glass Steagall Act, the lure of higher revenues and greater liquid-
19. Although Glass-Steagall is often used synonymously in reference to the entire Banking
Act of 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act only encompasses the four sections within the Banking Act
that limit bank involvement in securities underwriting. See Clark & Saunders, supra note 6, at
725; infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
The importance of the Glass-Steagall Act's separation is evidenced by the Congressional ex-
emption of commercial banks from most legislation regulating the securities markets. The Securi-
ties Act of 1933 excluded banks from provisions requiring registration of new securities.
Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 excluded banks from its statutory definitions of
"broker' and "dealer." In 1940, the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisors Act
excluded commercial banks from the definitions of "investment company" and "investment advi-
sor." See R. POZEN, supra note 2, at 512.
20. Clark & Saunders, supra note 6, at 725.
21. The statutory language provides that it is unlawful:
[flor any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organiza-
tion engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at whole-
sale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of
receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook,
certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor ....
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1976).
22. Section 20 prohibits the use of affiliates to circumvent section 21. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976).
Due to the statutory definition of "affiliate," however, bank holding companies could avoid divest-
ment of securities affiliates by not voting their bank subsidiary shares. A bank could own or
control less than a majority of the voting shares of the affiliate or less than 50% of the shares voted
for the election of directors and, under the statutory definition, avoid classification of the security
affiliate as an "affiliate." See 12 U.S.C. § 221(b) (1976); 450 U.S. at 69-70.
Section 32 prohibits affiliation between securities companies and banks by means of officers,
employees, partners, or interlocking directorates. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1976); see Clark & Saunders,
supra note 6, at 726-27.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see Clark & Saunders, supra note 6, at 727.
24. Id.
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ity has enticed commercial banks to enter certain aspects of the securities busi-
ness.2-5 The initial means of circumventing the Act was through the use of
bank holding companies, which could easily escape the Act's coverage.2 6
Congressional concern about the potential detrimental effects of bank holding
companies led to the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,27
which required bank holding companies with two or more banks to divest
themselves of their non-bank assets.2 A major exception to this requirement
allowed bank holding companies to retain or acquire companies of a financial,
fiduciary, or insurance nature that engage in activities determined by the FRB
to be "closely related to the business of banking or managing or controlling
banks."29
In 1970, amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act 30 gave the FRB
the ability to expand permissible bank holding company activities by deleting
the congressionally imposed requirement that an activity be of a financial,
fiduciary, or insurance nature and giving the FRB in section 4(c)(8) full discre-
tion to determine whether an activity is "so closely related to banking or man-
aging or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 31 Congress
25. Enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act did not prevent bank entry into the securities indus-
try. Roberta Karmel, a former Commissioner of the SEC, explained the situation as follows:
The Glass-Steagall Act did not totally ban commercial banks from the securities indus-
try. Like so much New Deal lekislation, it was a reactive and pragmatic response to
specified perceived wrongs. The statute put restraints on certain banking activities,
rather than enunciating a broad philosophical rationale for dividing a formerly
homogeneous financial community into two subcultures. Since some of these restraints
are on potentially profitable activities, avoidance of statutory restrictions has been a
challenge for bankers and their lawyers.
Karmel, supra note 9, at 632.
During the 1960s banks began to offer a variety of investment services, includin; collectively
managed agency accounts, see infra notes 37 & 39, automatic investment services, dividend rein-
vestment plans, individual portfolio management services, advisory services to investment compa-
nies, and private placement services for customers. See Edwards, Bank and Securities Activitles:
Legal and Economic Perspectives on the Glass-SteagallAct, in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANK-
ING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIEs 273 (L. Goldberg & L. White, ed. 1979); Clark & Saunders,
supra note 6, at 724; Clark & Saunders, supra note 9; Note, The Legality ofBank-SponsoredInvest-
ment Services, 84 YALE LJ. 1477 (1975).
26. The Act was only applicable to bank holding companies that voted their shares in subsid-
iary banks and whose banks were members of the Federal Reserve System. See supra note 22.
27. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)).
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976).
29. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (amended
1970); infra notes 30-32.
30. Pub. L. No. 91-607, tit. I, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A)(1976)). The main purpose of the amendments was to close a loophole by bringing one-bank
holding companies within the provisions of the Act. The FRB and the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency testified before Congress in favor of the one-bank definition when the original legislation
was passed in 1956. The Act did not conform to the FRB's position, however, until the amend-
ments were passed. M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 12, at 10.
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976). In addition to removing the requirement that a company's
activities must be of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature, Congress also deleted the phrase
"closely related to the business of banking," [emphasis added] and replaced it with "closely related
to banking." This is consistent with Congress's intent to provide the banking industry with the
flexibility to expand into bank-related activities that pass muster with the FRB. See 450 U.S. at 76
n.58; M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 12, at 20.
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required the FRB to consider whether the benefits produced by the affiliate's
activities would outweigh possible adverse effects in making its determina-
tion.32 In effect, the legislative changes gave the FRB increased discretionary
power to make qualitative decisions concerning what types of services offered
by bank holding companies are best for the public and curtailed bank holding
company expansion into the investment banking industry without regulatory
approval from the FRB.
Another means by which banks could gain entry into the securities indus-
try was through the expansion of trust activities into the area of investment
funds.3 3 This occurred during the mid-1930s when bank trust departments
began to operate common trust funds. By merging the assets of several small
to medium-sized trust accounts into one investment fund, a bank could reduce
its administrative costs and provide a more diversified investment portfolio for
those trust accounts. 34
The FRB eventually became concerned with the growth of common trust
funds and the use of this investment tool by national banks in their fiduciary
capacity. 35 Before the FRB could tighten regulations governing these funds,
however, the banking industry convinced Congress to place control of trust
functions with the Comptroller of the Currency.3 6 The Comptroller immedi-
ately revised the rules governing collective investment of trust funds to permit
the use of managing agency accounts.37 Managing agency accounts involve
32. As amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976) states:
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or managing
or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a
holding company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as
greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible
adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competi-
tion, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practice.
33. The common trust fund involved the merger of smaller trust accounts into one fund for
collective management. The practice gained popularity when the Revenue Act of 1936 provided
that all funds complying with the FRB's rules and regulations on the collective investment of trust
funds by national banks would be tax-exempt. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648, 1708
(1936) (current version codified at 26 U.S.C. § 584). The FRB amended its bank trust department
rules in 1937 to permit national banks to operate common trust funds when they were in further-
ance of "bona fide fiduciary purposes." See Lybecker, Bank-Sponsored Investment Management
Services: Consideration of the Regulatory Problems, and Suggested Legislative and Statutory Re-
sponses, 1977 DuK L.J. 983, 988-94; Note, The Common Trust Fund Statutes-A Legalization of
Commingling, 37 COLuM. L. Rav. 1384 (1937).
34. See Lybecker, supra note 33, at 988-89; Note, supra note 33, at:1384.
35. In 1960 the FRB proposed tightening regulations governing common trust funds in re-
sponse to bank utilization of common trust funds as a vehicle to provide customers the opportu-
nity to invest in risk securities. See Lybecker, Bank-SponsoredIn vestment Management Services:
A LegalHistory and Statutory Interpretive Analysis (pt. 1), 5 SEc. REG. L.J. 110, 151-52 (1977); see
also Judd, Common Trust Funds Under New Regulation 9, 102 TR. & EsT. 569, 570 (1963).
36. The banking industry was strongly opposed to the FRB's proposed limitations on com-
mon trust fund activities. The industry initiated a massive campaign to place the regulatory con-
trol of trust activities into friendlier hands. See Lybecker, supra note 35.
37. The Comptroller amended existing trust regulations in 1963 to include the pooling of
managing agency accounts as a fiduciary activity and deleted the corresponding requirement that
the bank and trust account must be for a bona fide fiduciary purpose. Amendment to Regulation
9,28 Fed. Reg. 3311 (1963) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1982)); see Saxon, New Trust Regulations
Prop osed- Comptroller Outlines Tentative Rules on Bank Fiduciary Powers and Collective Invest-
ment Funds, 102 TR. & EsT. 95, 136-37 (1963).
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"investment advisory or investment management arrangements where some-
thing less than the usual trustee type relationship is created; they are the func-
tional equivalent of investment advisory services provided by broker-dealers
or investment advisors."'38 By allowing these accounts to be pooled, the
Comptroller effectively permitted banks to operate mutual funds under the
guise of a trust service.39 Since the operation of mutual funds is a significant
part of investment banking, this put commercial banks in direct competition
with investment banks. The timeliness of the Comptroller's action was perfect
for the commercial banking industry:
By the end of 1961, there were 511 common trust funds with assets
exceeding $3.5 billion, 48 F.R.B. 528 (May, 1962), and the first of the
modem "bull" markets was clearly getting underway. Thus, the col-
lective investment management mechanisms were available and the
equity securities market was primed for delivering profits if the
banks could only get a larger share of the total investment manage-
ment action.4°
The Securities and Exchange Commission took a dim view of this
strategem. Despite the industry's contention that commingled managing
agency accounts were exempt from SEC regulation under the trust fund exclu-
sion,41 the Commission considered the accounts to be a vehicle for public in-
vestment that required the protection of the federal securities laws.42 After
nearly a decade of debate over this issue, the controversy was settled by theSupreme Court in Investment Company Institute v. Camp.43 In Camp the
Court held that sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited banks
from offering commingled managing agency accounts to the public.44 Writing
for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that the Act clearly prohibited banks from
operating mutual funds.45 Characterizing commingled managing agency ac-
38. Lybecker, supra note 35, at 153-54.
39. Banks had long been permitted to operate managing agency accounts for their customers,
but not on a collective basis. When offered on a collective basis, the service becomes tantamount
to operating a mutual fund. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. By offering commingled
managing agency accounts as part of their trust services, banks attempted to avoid SEC regulation
of their activities. See Lybecker, supra note 33.
40. Lybecker, supra note 35, at 152-53 n.130.
41. The Investment Company Act of 1940 excluded common trust funds from its definition
of an investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1976). The primary reason for the exclusion
was the fiduciary nature of the fund and the desire to avoid duplication of supervision. Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on . 3580 Before the Subcom. on Securities and
Exchange of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 925-29
(1940).
42. See Common Trust Funds-Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regulation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm on Legal and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm on Government Opera.
tions, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 & apps. BI-B19 (1963) (testimony of William Cary, Chairman, SEC);
see also SEC Legislation, 1963: Hearings on S. 1642 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1963) (testimony of William
Cary, Chairman, SEC) (bank regulation is insufficient to protect investors).
43. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
44. Id. at 639; see also supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
45. Justice Stewart observed that it was legal for a bank to act as a managing agent or to
commingle trust funds. Nevertheless, "the union of these powers gives birth to an investment
fund whose activities are of a different character." 401 U.S. at 625.
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counts as mutual funds, Justice Stewart indicated that the differences between
these accounts and conventional open-end mutual funds were "subtle at best,"
and that the agency accounts were "in direct competition with the mutual fund
industry."'46
The FRB took the next step in the movement toward reuniting investment
and commercial banking through expansion of the bank holding company
concept.4 7 On August 12, 1971, the FRB issued notice of its intentions to
amend Regulation Y4 by expanding the list of activities it considered to be
"closely related" to banking, thereby increasing the scope of bank holding
company activities.49 The proposed amendment permitted bank holding com-
panies to serve as investment advisors to the investment companies registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940.50 In addition to managing the
investment company's portfolio, investment advisors usually sponsor, organ-
ize, and ultimately control the investment company.51 Due to the intimate
relationship between investment companies and their advisors, strong opposi-
tion to the FRB proposal was voiced by the Department of Justice, which
claimed that allowing bank holding companies to serve as investment advisors
would be equivalent to permitting securities underwriting by banks. 52 The se-
curities industry, another opponent of the amendment, argued that the pro-
posed amendment was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Camp
because it opened the door to the "more subtle hazards" created by the com-
mingling of investment and commercial banking services. 53
The FRB adopted the amendment, but subsequently narrowed its scope
in an interpretive ruling.5 4 The ruling identified the concerns of the Depart-
46. Id The Court's decision was based on the definitional issue whether a commingled man-
aging agency account was a "security" as defined by the federal securities laws. Having deter-
mined that such an account is a security, the Court did not need to decide whether the operation
of a commingled managing agency account would be governed by the SEC, the Comptroller of
the Currency, or the FRB.
47. The FRB voiced dissatisfaction with the actions taken by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency in 1963. See supra note 37; Lybecker, supra note 35, at 156-57. By employing the bank
holding company concept, however, the commercial bank was not directly involved in the securi-
ties transactions. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 1.
49. Section 225.4 of Regulation Y identifies specific activities in which a bank holding com-
pany or one of its affiliates may engage. These are activities that the FRB (pursuant to its author-
ity under the Bank Holding Company Act) has determined to be "closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks." 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1982); see supra notes 31-32 and accompany-
ing text.
50. See supra note 3.
51. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(e) (1982).
52. See Lybecker, Bank-Sponsored Investment Management Services: A Legal History and
Statutory Interpretive Analysis (pt. 2), 5 SEc. REG. L.J. 195, 217 n.60 (1978).
53. Id; see also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text; 450 U.S. at 65.
54. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4(a)(5)(ii), 225.125 (1982). In addition to the primary restriction that
limits bank holding company advisory activities to closed-end investment companies, see id
§ 225.125(0, the interpretive ruling stated that a bank holding company and its bank and nonbank
subsidiaries should not: (1) be readily identifiable with the investment company by name or loca-
tion; (2) purchase securities of the investment company for their accounts, or in their sole discre-
tion purchase such securities for a trust or managing agency account; (3) extend credit to the
investment company, or accept securities of the investment company as collateral for a loan that is
for the purpose of purchasing securities of the investment company; (4) engage directly or indi-
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ment of Justice and the securities industry, and concluded that the Glass-Stea-
gall Act forbids a bank holding company from sponsoring, operating, or
controlling a mutual fund.5 5 The FRB stated, however, that the Act's restric-
tions were inapplicable to closed-end investment companies, which, unlike
mutual funds, "are not primarily or frequently engaged in the issuance, sale
and distribution of securities."'56
Dissatisfied with the FRB's interpretive ruling, the Investment Company
Institute (ICI), a trade association of mutual funds, petitioned the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals for a direct review of the amendment and the
accompanying interpretive ruling.5 7 The ICI charged that the FRB's action
was inconsistent with sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act and was
unauthorized by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.58 In vacating the
amendment, the court held that the FRB's action was not in violation of the
Glass-Steagall Act,59 but that section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company
Act did not empower the FRB to authorize such activities.60
The court reviewed the legislative history surrounding the Glass-Steagall
Act and determined that the policy underlying the Act required a complete
separation of investment and commercial banking.61 The court concluded
that since the Bank Holding Company Act was designed to prevent the bank-
ing industry from circumventing the Glass-Steagall Act by means of the bank
holding company, Congress did not intend to undermine the purpose of the
Act by authorizing the FRB to permit bank holding companies to operate se-
curity affiliates.62
Upon review by the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, concluded that the amendment did not exceed the FRB's statutory au-
thority since it was consistent with the Bank Holding Company Act,63 was not
rectly in the sale or distribution of the investment company's securities; or (5) maintain excess
demand deposit balances in the investment company account, or invest cash funds of the invest-
ment company in a time deposit account. Id § 225.125(f)-(i).
55. Id § 225.125(f).
56. Id; see supra note 2.
57. The Investment Company Institute consists of 356 open-end investment companies, to-
gether with their 159 investment advisers and 120 principal underwriters. The ICI represents
almost 93% of the assets of domestic investment companies. Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 606 F.2d 1004, 1006 n.I (D.C. Cir. 1979).
58. Id at 1006. For a description of these provisions, see supra notes 21, 23 & 29-32 and
accompanying text.
59. The court concluded that a bank holding company with a security affiliate that operates
as an investment adviser to a closed-end investment company does not violate the Glass-Steagall
Act because the security affiliate does not perform commercial banking services and the bank
affiliate does not engage in investment services. 606 F.2d at 1011-14.
60. Id at 1015. See supra note 32.
61. Id at 1016.
62. In order to support the view that the objectives of the Glass-Steagal Act are incorporated
into the Bank Holding Company Act, the court stressed that "the effect of the Act as viewed by
later Congresses" was to divorce investment and commercial banking. Id at 1016 (emphasis in
original). The court inferred that Congress would have intended to prohibit a bank holding com-
pany from operating a closed-end investment company under the limitations imposed by the
FRB's interpretive ruling, but the court failed to review the implications of the FRB's limitations.
Id at 1016 n.30 and accompanying text.
63. 450 U.S. at 76-77; see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act,64 and, through the interpretive ruling,
avoided the potential hazards that association between bank affiliates and in-
vestment companies could create.65 The Supreme Court looked beyond the
statutory language to discern the rationale behind the enactment of both the
Glass-Steagail and Bank Holding Company Acts. In applying the legislative
history of the acts to the situation presented, the Court's main concern was
whether the public would be effectively protected against the abuses that
brought about the legislation.66
The Court initially noted that investment advisory services were not sig-
nificantly different from the fiduciary functions traditionally performed by
banks.67 This supported the premise that the service was an activity closely
related to banking under section 4(c)(8). Further strengthening the FRB's po-
sition, the Court stated that the FRB's determination of closely related activi-
ties was "entitled to the greatest deference," because the authority for a
specific activity must be preceded by the FRB's determination that the re-
quested relationship can be expected to provide benefits to the public. 68 The
Court then determined that banking practices, the deference afforded to the
FRB, and a normal reading of the statutory language led to the conclusion
that the amendment did not violate the Bank Holding Company Act.69 In its
review of possible Glass-Steagall Act violations, the Court held that a bank's
activities as an investment advisor do not necessarily violate sections 16 and 21
of the Act. Even assuming that they did, the Court decided that the activities
were allowable within the present context because bank affiliates are not as
limited in their activities as banks themselves.
70
The Court reviewed the legislative history of section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act,7 1 on which the court of appeals rested its opinion, and
found no evidence that the 1956 Act and the 1970 amendments were "in-
tended to effect a more complete separation between commercial and invest-
ment banking than the separation that the Glass-Steagall Act had achieved
64. 450 U.S. at 64-65; see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
65. 450 U.S. at 66; see supra notes 14-17 & 54 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 12-17 & 25-27 and accompanying text.
67. The Court noted that "[tihe principal activity of an investment advisor is to manage the
investment portfolio of its advisee--4o invest and reinvest the funds of the client." In their capac-
ity as executors, trustees, or managing agents, banks have performed this activity for over a cen-
tury. 450 U.S. at 55.
68. Id at 56-57. The Court quoted from the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge in Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, which indicated another reason for deferring
to the FRB's judgment:
Their specialized experience gives them an advantage judges cannot possibly have, not
only in dealing with the problems raised by the system's workings, but also in ascertain-
ing the meaning Congress had in mind in prescribing the standards by which they should
administer it. Accordingly their judgment in such matters should by overturned onlywhere th re is no reasonable basis to sus a it or wher  they exercise it in a man er
which learly exceeds their statutory authority.
Id. at 56 n.21 (quoting 329 U.S. 441, 450 (1947)).
69. Id at 56-58.
70. Id at 59-64.
71. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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with respect to banks in sections 16 and 21. ''72 Unlike the lower court, the
Supreme Court failed to read into the Bank Holding Company Act a specific
limitation on the FRB's discretionary power regarding securities-related activ-
ities and concluded that the FRB's discretionary power to approve securities-
related activities that it deems are "closely related to banking" is not limited
beyond the prohibitions outlined in the Glass-Steagall Act.
73
Despite its holding, the Court expressed continued concern for the separa-
tion of commercial and investment banking. The Court upheld its decision in
Camp by distinguishing the present case on the basis of the nature of the activ-
ities performed.74 In Camp banks were permitted to underwrite units of par-
ticipation that were equivalent to securities; therefore, section 16 of the Glass-
Steagall Act was violated.7 5 In FRB v. IC!, however, the shares were of a
closed-end investment company, and although the shares did fall within the
definition of a "security," they were "not issued, sold or underwritten" by the
bank under the express prohibition of the interpretive ruling.76 By confirming
the Camp decicion in FRB v. ICI, the Court reaffirmed its interpretation of the
Glass-Steagall Act as prohibiting bank underwriting of securities. In doing so,
it identified its concern for protecting the investing public and the banking
system from the "danger of banks using bank assets in imprudent securities
investments." 77 The Court also implied that it would police activities that in-
volve the "more subtle hazards of bank-security related functions. 78 This
would ensure that the improprieties which necessitated the Glass-Steagall Act
would be sufficiently controlled.7 9
Recent rumblings from Congress and the current administration indicate
that the Glass-Steagall Act, and the separation of investment and commercial
banking that it achieved, may be legislatively dismantled. Currently under
Senate review is the Bank Holding Company Deregulation Act of 1982,80
which was introduced by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Jake Garn.
The bill permits bank holding companies to form securities affiliates that oper-
72. 450 U.S. at 71. The Court determined that the Bank Holding Company Act was intended
to remedy the inadequacy of the Glass-Steagall Act in "seyering the connection between bank
holding companies and affiliates 'principally engaged' in the securties business." Id. This did not
support the lower court's proposition that § 4(c)(8) totally prohibited bank holding companies
from engaging in any securities-related activities, because "[investment advisors and investment
companies are not 'principally engaged' in the issuance or the underwriting of securities within the
meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act." Id; see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
73. 450 U.S. at 77.
74. Id at 64-68.
75. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 54.
77. 450 U.S. at 65-67.
78. Id at 66-67. These subtle hazards include undue reliance by the public on the bank
holding company's investment affiliate because of its relationship with the bank, loss of public
confidence in the bank, and conflicts of interest that are conducive to unsound banking practices
or to the inability to render disinterested investment advice. Id at 66-67 n.38; see supra notes 14-
17 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
80. S. 2490, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The bill has been introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives by Representative Stanton of Ohio. H.R. 6720, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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ate mutual funds and underwrite government and municipal securities.81 The
Reagan administration has given its support to similar legislation and has in-
dicated that such proposals are the first in a series of measures which will
amend banking laws that currently limit direct competition among banks,
thrift institutions, and securities firms.8 2 The SEC has also indicated its ap-
proval, stating that "Glass-Steagall concerns need not continue to stand in the
way of bank underwriting of municipal revenue bonds and money market
fund shares."8 3 The SEC's position is based on the premise that flexible regu-
lation through agencies will better serve the public interest than the rigid bar-
riers that the Glass-Steagall Act imposes.84
Underlying the current legislation is a need to make commercial banks
more competitive in the financial markets. The growth of money market
funds over the past five years has posed a serious threat to depository institu-
tions by causing a significant shift of funds from low-interest deposit accounts
to higher paying instruments.8 5 Combined with this threat are the recent
81. The introduction to the bill states its purpose:
To authorize the formation of a bank securities affiliate to deal in, underwrite and
purchase government and municipal securities, to sponsor and manage investment com-
panies and underwrite the securities thereof, to authorize bank holding companies to
engage in activities of a financial nature, insurance underwriting and brokerage, real
estate development or brokerage, to amend Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act and
for other purposes.
S. 2490, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
82. The Reagan Administration indicated its support of the Financial Institutions Restruc-
turing and Services Act of 1981, S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See Bacon, Regan Outlines
Deregulation of.Banks, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1981, at 2, col. 2. This bill is a comprehensive piece of
legislation introduced by Senator Gan that would allow banks and savings and loan associations
to underwrite municipal revenue bonds and operate mutual funds. It would also loosen lending
restrictions on banks and savings and loans. See Pryor, Financial Legislation Prompts Lobbying
War: Bil'r Fate Rests with Lobbyists, Legal Times Wash., Oct. 26, 1981, at 29, col. 3.
83. FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) No. 937, at 7 (Oct. 28, 1981). The article summarizes statements
made by SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth. Commissioner Longstreth objected to the failure
of the 1981 bill to authorize bank regulatory agencies to establish standards for the entry of com-
mercial banks into these areas of investment banking. Id at 8. The 1982 bill amends the Federal
Reserve.Act, permitting the FRB to establish regulations for security affiliates of bank holding
companies.
The first inroad in the area of deregulatory change was achieved on October 15, 1982, when
President Reagan signed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. The Act
offers remedial assistance to troubled and failing financial institutions by expanding FDIC and
FSLIC authority to provide direct and merger-related assistance to insured banks and savings
institutions. In addition, the Act directs the Depository Institution Deregulatory Committee to
create a new insured deposit account that will be competitive with money market funds. See
Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. - (1982).
84. Id at 7; see Karmel, supra note 9, at 633-39.
85. Money market funds were first offered in 1976. Since that time fund assets have in-
creased to over $150 billion, with Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.'s $31 billion in money market fund
assets exceeding the total deposit base of Citicorp/Citibank, N.A. The real threat to banks lies in
the shifting of customer deposits to the more attractive money market funds. The funds, which
are not subject to Regulation Q's interest rate ceilings, see 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1982), are able to
provide a higher rate of return to their investors than traditional time deposit accounts or certifi-
cates of deposit. In addition, the cost of providing money market funds is substantially lower than
the cost of maintaining consumer deposit accounts. See Mulhern, Competition, Restriction Limit
Role of Commercial Banks, Legal Times Wash., Oct. 26, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
Recent legislation has helped alleviate this threat by providing depository institutions with an
insured deposit account that will compete with existing money market funds. See Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, supra note 83.
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moves by nonregulated corporations into the securities industry86 and invest-
ment banking into the commercial banking business. 87 These actions have
allgwed the commercial banks' competition to expand dramatically their serv-
ices and to increase in number, while existing regulations have relegated banks
to the "bench."' 3 In light of these circumstances, only major revisions of the
statutory scheme will provide a satisfactory solution to the banking industry's
dilemma.
The proposed legislation indicates that if the Glass-Steagall Act is to be
discarded, a gradual approach will be taken in dismantling the barrier be-
tween commercial and investment banking.89 This phased approach will al-
low banks to concentrate their efforts on specific investment banking services
to determine whether they are profitable, feasible, and in line with corporate
strategy. Likewise, the amalgamation of the two industries would afford Con-
gress and the regulatory agencies an opportunity to determine if the merchant
banking system utilized in Great Britain would be beneficial to the United
States economy.90 More importantly, a phased approach to deregulation gives
the governing agencies time to develop and test a regulatory scheme that will
adequately protect the investing public prior to a full repeal of the Glass-Stea-
gall ActY1 Unfortunately, the current legislation has caused a great deal of
turmoil among the various financial institutions. Due to the lobbying strength
of these factions, the legislation will undoubtedly be slow in coming and will
involve a great deal of compromise.
FRB v. ICI afforded the Court an opportunity to interpret the legislative
86. Recently, several large corporations have moved into the investment banking area. Per-
haps the most threatening of these is the combination of American Express Co. and Shearson
Loeb Rhodes, Inc. (an investment banking firm), due to the wide variety of services that the new
corporation can offer. In addition, Prudential Insurance Co. of America has acquired Bache Hal-
sey Stuart Shields Inc., and Sears, Roebuck & Co. has announced that it will offer a mutual fund.
These moves indicate a trend toward the creation of 'near bank" conglomerates. Id at 30, cols. 1-
4; at 36, coL 1.
87. Investment banking firms have been able to circumvent Glass-Steagall Act prohibitions
and provide checking account services (through a commercial bank) for their money market funds
or securities margin accounts. Securities firms have been even more direct in foreign markets by
acquiring or otherwise affiliating with foreign banks. See Edwards, supra note 25, at 274-75.
88. Besides being unable to offer competitive services, bank holding companies are delayed,
if not deterred, in their efforts to expand services by the approval process required under § 4(c)(8)
of the Bank Holding Company Act. See Mulhern, supra note 85, at 30, col. 3. Some participants
in the financial markets (the ICI in particular) believe that the role of banks in the financial system
precludes their entry into the securities field. See Fink, No Public Benefitsfrom Banks Entering
MuttualFund Business, Legal Times Wash., Oct. 26, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
89. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan has indicated that the administration is concerned that
immediate full-scale deregulation would cause chaos within the financial markets. To avoid this,
the administration supports a gradual phasing in of bank involvement in the securities industry.
Bacon, supra note 82; see Pryor, supra note 82, at 36, col 4.
90. Merchant banking involves amalgamating commercial and investment banking into one
homogeneous financial system. For a discussion of how merchant banking would work in the
United States, see Merchant Banking-Is the U.S. Readyfor It, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1976, at 54.
91. The merger of commercial and investment banking will require a concerted effort by the
SEC and FRB. One potential problem with developing a satisfactory regulatory structure will be
determining the responsibilities and jurisdiction of each agency. Currently there is no clear de-
lineation in the proposed legislation of how duties will be divided. See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
No. 937, at 7-8 (Oct. 28, 1981).
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objectives of both the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act.
In evaluating the legislative intent behind the statutes in the context of today's
financial markets, the Court determined that a complete separation between
commercial and investment banking was not required. The Court indicated
that it will defer to the Federal Reserve Board's judgment in matters concern-
ing the banking industry unless the FRB's actions clearly violate the objectives
of congressional mandates. Given pending legislation and the flexibility it of-
fers to regulatory agencies, the Court's decision means that the Federal Re-
serve Board may become unfettered in its ability to approve bank holding
company activities. This places the brunt of the responsibility for guarding the
public interest on the agencies that govern financial institutions and necessi-
tates joint action by the FRB and SEC to ensure that deregulation of commer-
cial and investment banking avoids the pitfalls experienced in the 1920s and
1930s. Given the competitive forces at play in the capital markets, this will
require an increasingly expansive definition of financial institutions and
securities.
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